This article argues that deeper Asian involvement in Arctic affairs can only strengthen international governance efforts in key areas like sustainable development, safety at sea, and environmental protection, whereas the potential drawbacks are modest. I review the main concerns voiced regarding outside influence over Arctic affairs, and then show that effective governance of this region will require active support by non-Arctic states within a range of global
by the states of the Arctic region: Should they worry about this development, or see it as an asset in their efforts to manage the rapid changes underway in the Arctic?
This article argues that deeper Asian involvement in Arctic affairs can only strengthen international governance efforts in key areas like sustainable development, safety at sea, and environmental protection, whereas the potential drawbacks are modest.
2 I review the main concerns voiced regarding outside influence over Arctic affairs, and then show that effective governance of this region will require active support by non-Arctic states within a range of global institutions. Thereafter I ask whether such support can be generated by deeper non-Arctic involvement in the work of the Arctic Council. The final section summarizes the argument and draws some conclusions relevant to policy decisions by the states involved.
Asia in the Arctic
Evidence of Asian-state interest in the Arctic is ample and not really as new as many believe.
Japan set up an Arctic research station in the early 1990s and funded the major share of the hitherto most comprehensive multinational research project on the physical, economic and political conditions for broader use of the Northern Sea Route. 3 China's ice-capable research vessel, the Xue Long ('snow dragon'), was acquired two decades ago, and the government agency responsible for polar activities added 'Arctic' to its name already in 1996. A recent study
indicates that China has now surpassed Japan in terms of annual listed periodical publications on
Arctic matters, with a 2012 output higher than that of India, Japan and Korea combined. Two concerns voiced about this development deserve attention. One is that deeper involvement on the part of these powerful actors might, in the long term, undermine the primacy of regional states in Arctic affairs; the second is that it might jeopardize the unique and prominent position that indigenous peoples have obtained within the Arctic Council. The first-mentioned concern has probably carried greater political weight, but neither of the two is compelling, as we shall see.
Geopolitical concerns
Regional worries over new players in Arctic politics derive from clearly discernible geopolitical and geo-economic shifts, reinforced by recent debate on the adequacy of the legal framework for Arctic governance. The USA is still well ahead of any Asian competitor in its capacity for military power projection and remains the world's strongest economy by far, not least in terms of technology and innovation. 7 Yet, many years of growth rates considerably lower than those achieved by several large 'emerging economies', like China and India, have made clear that this ranking is not written in stone. Although another Arctic state, Russia, remains the world's number two military power, China is rapidly narrowing the gap, especially as regards conventional capability. 8 Moreover, Russia's economic structure is in general less diversified and more dependent on resource extraction than are those of the leading Asian states. And Moscow has somewhat mixed feelings about the surge in Chinese investments in, and immigration to, the Russian Far East. 
The indigenous voice
Also questionable is the second concern as regards the rising involvement of non-regional states.
Among the premises for Canada's Arctic policy, those originating with the country's indigenous populations loom large, and go a long way in explaining Canada's scepticism to granting the European Union (EU) a formal role in the Arctic Council. 18 Prior to filing its application for observer status, the EU had introduced a ban on trade in seal-skin products, economically and symbolically important to certain indigenous populations. More generally, some indigenouspeoples' representatives worry that involving political and economic heavyweights like the EU, China and India might divert the attention paid to indigenous concerns, as well as affecting their own access to high-level decision-makers within the Council framework. building alliances and influencing deliberation than is otherwise common for non-governmental organizations in international diplomacy. In contrast, the observer status applied for by Asian states entails only a right to submit documents and to make statements, with the latter even being subject to the discretion of the chair. 21 Observer status therefore provides no formal or de facto basis for exerting pressure on Council decisions -only an opportunity for non-Arctic states to have their voice heard by those who make the decisions. Granting such status to the modest number of current new applicants is unlikely to detract significantly from the prominence of the Permanent Participants in the activities of the Arctic Council.
The promise of Asian involvement
Deeper involvement by Asian players has every potential to generate win-win situations. Much of the activity that gives rise to Arctic environmental challenges either occurs outside the region or falls under the jurisdiction of non-Arctic states. This is true for a majority of the persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals that threaten to damage regional ecosystems, as well as the greenhouse gases that drive up Arctic temperatures. Shipping remains a high-seas freedom, also within the EEZs, although special rules can apply in ice-covered waters in accordance with the UNCLOS 'ice article' 234. Dealing effectively with these key Arctic challenges requires regulatory action in broader international institutions, typically global ones like the Stockholm POPs Convention, the UN-based climate regime, and the IMO. 
